The sparsely populated state of Nebraska is best known for its cold climate, corn, beef and football. But Nebraska has also contributed an impressive array of national luminaries in the fields of literature (novelist Willa Cather, poet John G. Neihardt), philosophy (Saul Kripke), the financial world (Warren Buffett) and show business (Henry Fonda, Fred Astaire, Marlon Brando, Johnny Carson, Nick Nolte, Alexander Payne). Some Nebraska politicians too have made their mark on the national stage – the indefatigable William Jennings Bryan (born Illinois, politics Nebraska), the dashing Bob Kerrey and the outspoken Chuck Hagel. There was another long serving senator from Nebraska, Roman Hruska (of whom I had heard but didn’t know much about), who too garnered some fame in his day, but not quite in the conventional manner. Just recently I learnt of Hruska’s dubious fame – he left an indelible mark on the history of senatorial rhetoric.
In 1970 Richard Nixon nominated G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court of the United States. The nomination was rejected by the Senate on the grounds that Carswells’ judicial record was mediocre. Senator Hruska was in favor of Carswell’s nomination and presented a novel, spirited and now memorable defense of mediocrity.
Hruska is best remembered in American political history for a 1970 speech he made to the Senate urging them to confirm the nomination of Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court. Responding to criticism that Carswell had been a mediocre judge, Hruska claimed that:
- "So what if he is mediocre? There are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they? We can’t have all Brandeises, Cardozos, and Frankfurters and stuff like that there."
This speech was criticized by many, and Carswell was eventually defeated.
Hruska must have felt vindicated when Clarence Thomas became Justice of the Supreme Court. Also, had he lived to see the outcome of the 2000 and the 2004 presidential elections, he would have been greatly pleased that a Champion of Mediocrity was installed in the highest office of the nation. Or perhaps he would have learnt late in life that mediocrity in a position of exceptional responsibility often spells disaster.
3 responses to “In Defense of Mediocrity”
Hruska may have been correct in more than one respect. Of course there are “a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers,” although the question remains how many of them presently occupy a seat on the Supreme Court. According to the OED, “mediocre” can mean “Of middling quality; neither bad nor good, average,” and also “of poor quality, second-rate. Used chiefly of literary or artistic works, ability, or knowledge, and hence of people considered with regard to their mental power or skill.” Ahem.
Coincidentally, one of the OED‘s examples of uses of the term is by a Sir R. Harrington, who wrote in an 1884 issue of Law Times, “The mediocre…always form numerically the largest portion of every profession.” Brilliant insight there, Sir H.
Curiously, the Time magazine article cited by the Wikipedia entry on Carswell seems to have imagined that the Hruska approach would not undermine the nominee’s chances: “While few Senators can find much to rave about in Carswell’s record, fewer still can find enough to deny him their vote.” The two connotations of mediocrity almost served the sponsor’s purpose.
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Well, well, well. Sure Hruska was right that there are “a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers.” In fact the wheels of justice, indeed that of the world, are turned by mediocre people. Most of us ARE mediocre. But that doesn’t mean that mediocre people must be represented by a seat of mediocrity in the highest offices of the nation. That they should be, is the laughable claim.
Like a slot on the Olympics squad or the Manhattan Project, there ought to be some designated seats in every nation’s (and the world’s) corridors of power and intellectual pursuit which must go only to the supremely able. The president of Lithuania can well be mediocre and not much harm (nor good) will come either to Lithuania or the world. But the president of the US doesn’t have the luxury of being mediocre. We are currently living through the nightmare of having elected a lovable(?) Joe Six Pack for our president. Similarly, the justices of the Supreme Court are not mere “judges” whose mediocrity is of little consequence to the history and destiny of the United States, both of which they shape. They are also the nation’s intellectual icons and teachers. It is not appropriate in their case to settle for mediocrity.
As for the following from the Time magazine article,
“Subjective criticism of his judicial talents, a 22-year-old racist speech, and other evidence of a segregationist past are considered insufficient reason to reverse the Senate tradition that a President is entitled to choose whom he wishes.”, it seems we are still hearing the same argument on the floors of congress including, surprisingly, allusions to segregationist pasts.
As for Carswell, I was quite interested to note the rather bizarre end to his public career. Perhaps he wasn’t that mediocre after all and would have lent some color to the hallowed and drab chambers of the Supreme Court! I wonder what Hruska may have thought when this fact of Carswell’s personal life came to light. Most probably breathed a sigh of relief that his passionate defense of Carswell and mediocrity failed.
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And speaking of mediocrity, I haven’t read all of the opinions in Morse v. Frederick, the absurd–make that absolutely unreasonable–bong hits ruling, but Linda Greenhouse pulled out this remark from Justice Thomas’ contribution: The court’s precedents had become incoherent, he said, adding, “I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in school except when they don’t.”
A couple responses. First, one of these days I’d like to catalog the occasions when jurists remark upon the incoherence of the law. Scholars do it all the time. It’s job security, after all. Imagine a law review article beginning, “First Amendment law has been sound and secure for decades. Really, there is nothing more to be said about it.”
Second, Thomas’ astute verbal Venn-diagram of an analysis pretty much captures the dynamic of most areas of law. XYZ is the rule, except when A,B, or C.
How does any of this support Thomas’ assertion that “it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment ‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right to speak in public schools”? I’m not sure, judging from this remark, what “seriously” means any more. But then neither am I any longer certain after Morse that there is an ordinary, conventional understanding of what “reasonable” means.
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