Neil Sinhababu has his own version of the famous train hypothetical. Apparently it's an ethical dilemma or something. Anyhow, he's doing "philosophical research" based on the responses that he gets — so go participate!
My response, for those who are curious:
the engineer. Conductor? I dunno, the person driving it.
Anyhow,
assuming that away, and assuming away the possibility that I know any
of these people — what I do is subject to change if I'm friends with
some of them; I'm not sure if what I think is "right" is also subject
to change — it's easy for me. Push the button. One life versus five,
it's pretty simple math.
(Actually, I'd like to know what's on
the train. Would that affect what I would actually do? No. But if in
the hypo we have perfect knowledge, it's possible that at some level of
value wrecking the train becomes a factor along with those six people
— e.g., if it's a train full of the only known source of the cure for
AIDS.)
My train-value counterfactual (or hypo?) isn't all that well thought out, obviously — why would there be a train full of the world's supply of AIDS cure? But I think I'd stand by the point that there comes a point at which the value of wrecking the train becomes a significant factor in the decision-making process.
(For what it's worth, despite my description of this as "simple math," I'm not a hard-line utilitarian. I'm pretty sure, though, that I'm some sort of consequentialist.)
Accidental Blogger 
3 responses to “Updated Train Hypo (Joe)”
Consequentialism seems like a useless tautology to me. But then, I am a converted, and thus deeply anti-, ex-utilitarian. Probably something to do with my child of an economist upbringing. Or at least, that’s what I think when the family economist in question inevitably responds to my cases involving hard-knocks clients who have unmet, potentially expensive but critical, needs by muttering about controlling costs.
My comment, which I posted:
I not only think that I would feel better if I let the five die instead of affirmatively killing the one, I think they’re normatively different. I would not push the button. Perhaps I’ve been brainwashed by the legal distinction between “nonfeasance” and “misfeasance,” or by our culture’s emphasis on individual rights. On reflection, though, this distinction and emphasis also just resonate with me for “veil of ignorance”/ do unto others reasons.
Of course the hypothetical assumes the peculiarity of perfect information, but within very narrow constraints (i.e. only about outcome within the next few minutes). Taking this out of the realm of philosophical exercise, I think I’d make the same choice not to push the button for the additional reason that it’s hard to eradicate contingency. Will the five actually live? Will the one actually die? Will the scaffold really stop the train? Does the one have fewer repercussions (i.e. no child depending solely on him) than the five? I think those kinds of doubts are additional reasons not to play hero in a way that seems certain to endanger someone other than yourself. A suicide dash into the tunnel to try futilely to save someone doesn’t seem as culpable to me, even though it’s odds-on outcome would be the loss of six lives instead of five or one.
I’d be more likely just to dedicate myself to affirmative assistance to the survivors, and I don’t think I’d feel horrible about it (though lingering doubts about bad choices are probably inevitable, and healthy). Pass better legislation for train safety. Donate money to the families. Run in after after the train has passed and see if you can administer ad hoc first aid. Believing that moral agency in a situation could ever be limited to pushing a button causes more problems than it solves, IMHO.
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If you’re not a consequentialist, I think, the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction makes a lot more sense — you’re either killing one person, or five people are dying on their own (act of God?). That makes more sense to me as a legal matter than a moral matter, where your actions will either result in one dead person, or five (or six).
But on the ground, there would be a limited time to act, and you’d have all the doubts you mentioned, and the assumed perfect information would be sorely lacking. I think that justifies not acting, and certainly it changes what I’d be likely to do. This renders the thought experiment fairly meaningless.
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I not only think that I would feel better if I let the five die instead of affirmatively killing the one, I think they’re normatively different. I would not push the button. Perhaps I’ve been brainwashed by the legal distinction between “nonfeasance” and “misfeasance,” or by our culture’s emphasis on individual rights. On reflection, though, this distinction and emphasis also just resonate with me for “veil of ignorance”/ do unto others reasons.
I agree with Anna. I have always found these types of moral dilemmas fairly easy to answer. I always come out on the side of not killing one individual affirmatively for the sake of saving more faced with “Hand of God (or machine)” peril.
And Joe, for me it is not so much a legal distinction between nonfeasance / misfeasance as a moral choice. I guess that makes me a deontologist, if I understand that term of moral philosophy correctly.
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