Accidental Blogger

A general interest blog

Bombing in Karachi :  Washington Post

A group of terrorists was able to get together and attack a major police facility with automatic weapons and a huge truck bomb. Obviously, these are not isolated disgruntled individuals taking revenge for the latest drone attack. They are well organized, well trained and well supplied with arms, ammunition, technical capability and intelligence. How did that come about? I had a facebook exchange after the news which maybe relevant to the question and led to this article.

First some background: A very intelligent senior journalist in Pakistan had complained that we are suffering in the war on terror and the US is asking us to "do more" without realizing how hard things are. The notion that we are being unfairly asked to “do more” and things would be fine if that was not done, is a common feeling in Pakistan. My reply was as follows.

 According to this version of events the US and other powers got a military dictator to arm and train these maniacs (no Pakistani interest in this scheme is implied), then things sort of coasted along happily for 12 years, then came 9-11 (frequently believed to be a Mossad-CIA operation) and the US came and said “we want them dead now”. Since then, we have been dutifully trying to kill these maniacs and the current Pakistani government in particular is trying its best to kill them and it is unfair of the US to ask us to "do more". I think this version of events misses some points.

 First of all, the jihadi project was indeed a CIA project, but it was also OUR project from the very beginning. America wanted Russia humbled in Afghanistan. WE wanted that humbling to be done by Islamist jihadis under our control and some of “us” had the foresight and brilliance to see in this an opportunity to settle scores with India and plant the seeds of our caliphate and so on and so forth. Second, after the CIA finished its dirty business in Afghanistan and left, “we” multiplied the jihadi infrastructure by 10. We redirected it to Kashmir and spread it throughout Pakistan. Of course the westoxicated burger-jihadi middle class had very little notion of what was going on. These were serious things, handled by serious people in the security establishment, not shared with the rest of the country except on a “need to know basis”.  But it is disingenuous to think the multiplication of jihadi militias throughout the nineties was also America's fault (though the US did ignore it, perhaps because they thought it improves their leverage over India, perhaps because they were busy with other things). Then, after 9-11 (which was not an inside job in my view), “we” (meaning our security services) protected good jihadis and failed to go after the indoctrination or finance pipelines because “we" wanted the infrastructure kept alive for future use against India.

The current government may be "doing more", but how will "doing less" help in this situation? And if the army is now on board with stopping this menace (and I think it may be that their leaders indeed are on board by now, though the rank and file is being fed a diet of anti-Indian and anti-Israeli propaganda to justify this action) then why are army-sponsored PR operators and ex-generals and admirals still writing op-eds as if the jihadis are our heroes and America is the enemy?

 Of course, even if the rickety state apparatus does determine to go all out against the jihadis, the process will be neither pretty nor quick. There is no simple way to put the genie back into the bottle. The half million who are already trained (Arif Jamal's figure in Shadow Wars) will have to be dealt with. Luckily, some have already moved on to other occupations and others have become simple criminals, busy with kidnapping and armed robbery. The more committed ones will have to be disarmed and jailed or killed. But in order to do that the state will have to shut down their financing, crack down on their above-ground supporters and win the battle of ideas in the mind of the public (and improve its functioning in general and make it less unjust, a problem it shares with India's rickety state). None of that can succeed if the state's own paid propagandists are busy spreading confusion and propaganda that undermines the psy-ops effort. It will also not succeed if the army is simultaneously trying to protect assets it hopes to use against India (because the “good jihadis” don’t seem to understand the distinction and frequently help out the “bad jihadis”). It will also not succeed if Saudi and Gulf financing is not being intercepted. In short, it will not stop unless the India-centric, zero-sum national security mindset is changed because that mindset leads to these people and their mentors being protected. For proof of this, you need to look no further than Musharraf’s moronic interviews with Der Spiegel  and now at the Atlantic council. In fact put that stupid interview together with Admiral Fasih Bokhari's article and you can see that the overgrown adolescents who are America's great white hope in Pakistan are perhaps more dangerous and deluded than the ball-scratching, nose-dripping, illiterate and corrupt gangsters in the civilian political parties. But, military men being military men, no Pentagon general seems to be able to resist the sight of a man in a finely starched uniform, especially if he also likes whisky (the one sure sign of "enlightened moderation", if the diplomatic reports of the US embassy from the last 50 years are any guide).

I am aware that some people think that the primary reason this effort is not being conducted effectively is not because of any real or imagined Indian threat but because the existence of this insurgency is in fact our ticket to more aid and assistance. I personally think this is too conspiracy-minded, but who knows. Another factor to consider is the role of the Military-Mullah alliance in domestic Pakistani politics. I.e. the fact that the army uses the mullahs as muscle power against secularists, mainstream politicians and "pro-Indian" elements. And of course, some demented ideologically committed junior officers may find the jihadists useful against heretics like Shias and Ismailis and other "undesirables". The last category (I hope) is confined to the lower ranks. The senior officers are not so much jihadist, as they are limited in their imagination and hooked on India and US aid, and not necessarily in that order.  

 

Posted in , ,

2 responses to “Bombed in Karachi (Omar)”

  1. You don’t mince words in the analysis, Omar. Bravo! This is the kind of realistic vision of the ground situation that always gets pushed back in favor of jingoistic platitudes in various forums,not only in Pakistan, but India, US, everywhere in the world. It’s the battle of agit-prop vs. truth.

    Like

  2. waqas

    There is sufficient evidence to prove that Pakistan’s security establishment is supporting Taliban o Qaida Inc and engaged in a propaganda war based on Islamism and anti-US sentiment. However the aim of this ‘great game’ is not only to gain ‘strategic depth’ or to defeat the imperialist designs of the US or India but more importantly to maintain a tight control on state power and to keep the middle class sentiments in check.
    The use of religion as an instrument of control in Pakistan is as old as the state. It is not surprising given the ‘ideological’ backdrop of the Pakistan Movement. Pakistani nationalism was largely based on Islam as a supra geographical identity and anti-hindu(kafirs, infidels)sentiments. The partition and the wars of 48 and 65 with India helped bolster these sentiments. The feudal elite of West Pakistan used Islam, though in the end unsuccessfully, against the Bengali middle classes and their secular sensibilities. The war of 71 was a great set back for Pakistan. In its aftermath Zulfikar Ali Bhutto foolishly tried to use Islam
    1)to strenghthen his feudal base,
    2)to help rebuild confidence of a defeated nation,
    3)to keep in control the populism of 60s and 70s, and
    4)to gain leverage in international affairs.
    This was by far the most comprehensive use of religion by any pakistani ruler. Bhutto also helped security establishment regain some of its lost ground. Zia ul Haq surpassed his mentor in his ab/use of religion. The Afghan war gave the security establishment a chance to grow in means and confidence.
    In the nineties, despite security establishment’s continued grip on power there were some positive developments. The relative openness and dawn of the information age diluted islamofascistic feelings. The cultural proximity with India resurfaced. The politicians realized the importance of normalcy of ties with India to have any chance of real power. All of this was countered by the Kargil war and the subsequent takeover.
    Pakistan’s security estalishment, at present, consists of some directotates of ISI, some elements of MI and the COAS. The eleven or so Corps Commanders and almost as many PSOs in the GHQ almost inevitably act on ‘need to know’ basis. They do have a say but that say largely depends upon the background of the individual officer. Zia ul Haq established CMI or corps of military intelligence in the eighties. Previously the practice in pakistan army was simple, an officer who did his Int course was posted on an int assignment for a couple of years and was then reverted to his normal combat duties. Career officers usually avoided long stints in the int because they hardly had any time for it as they had to fulfill their command and staff duties plus do courses required for every rank. Once the CMI was established things changed. At present it has become an elite corps of spies who look at the mainstream of armed forces as an ‘expendable strategic and tactical asset’.
    The strategic depth and India centric mindset is obviously there but the civilian rule of nineties has taught our establishment an important lesson. Every civilian ruler, no matter how corrupt or weak, from junejo to nawaz sharif, would ultimately go for the real power. Benazir Bhutto, despite her weaknesses, understood the dynamics and yet publicly announced to confront the terrorists in waziristan(probably to make herself more attractive to the west). That sealed her fate. Her murder case file is a good document in the sense that it painstakingly builds chain of evidence from liaqat bagh to baitullah mehsud and there are enough people around who know the masters of baitullah.
    I know most of what i’ve said is disjointed and loose but i wanted to convey some cues so that anyone interested in the subject can pick the threads and weave his or her own cloth.

    Like

Leave a reply to Sujatha Cancel reply